Reconciling the Narratives of the Great In ‡ation
Great In ‡ation of the 1970s, and the Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s, are testing grounds for economic theories Various stories: -Bad policy: Fed chose policies that led to suboptimal outcomes (Clarida et al., 2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004) -Bad luck: 1970s were characterized by adverse shocks (Sims and Zha, 2006) -Learning: the Fed did not know the structure of the economy, leading to policy choices that are sub-optimal ex-post (Sargent et al., 2005) -Misperception: Fed misinterpreted data and unwittingly chose suboptimal policies (Orphanides, 2001) We reconcile these stories: optimal central bank behavior can imply an indeterminate private sector equilibrium because of data misperceptions and uncertainty about the structure of the economy
We …nd that the 1970s are characterized by an alternating sequence of indeterminate and determinate equilibria.
Provide an argument for why central banks paradoxically choose policy rules that imply indeterminate equilibria
Our Conceptual Approach
Central bank (CB):
-observes real-time data that are subject to future revisions: Orphanides (2001) -does not know the true data-generating process, gathers information by estimating a backward-looking model (least-squares learning): Primiceri (2006) -solves for policy from a linear-quadratic dynamic programming problem over an ad-hoc welfare function: Sargent, Williams and Zha (2006) Private sector (PS):
-knows the true monetary policy rule in each period, takes policy as given, forms rational expectations -myopic in the sense that policy rule is believed to last forever even if is reoptimized every period Each period CB and PS behavior results in a rational expectations model that is solved using standard methods: allow for indeterminate equilibria as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) Model is estimated using Bayesian methods Indeterminacy, Learning, and Measurement Error Measurement error in real-time data leads to biased coe¢ cient estimates of the CB's learning model
As the estimated coe¢ cients of the central bank's model and the associated policy rule change, so does private sector behavior
In each period, there is a rational expectations equilibrium that is either unique or indeterminate
It is the shifts of the policy rule (for …xed private sector parameters) that move the economy across the threshold between the determinate and indeterminate regions of the parameter space 'Bad Policy'(i.e., indeterminacy) arises not because of intent, but because of data mismeasurement and incomplete knowledge of the economy on behalf of the central bank.
The Central Bank (I)
Each period the central bank observes its state vector X t , which is a noisy measurement of the true outcomes:
The measurement error is serially correlated (Orphanides, 2001):
The CB sets the interest rate target:
based on a policy rule of the form:
where " i t is a monetary policy implementation error The policy coe¢ cients t are chosen each period from an optimal policy problem as in Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006) The Central Bank (II)
The CB minimizes:
subject to estimated laws of motion of the following form: (2004) Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
Output dynamics:
Serially correlated demand and supply shocks:
How do private agents form expectations and views about the steady states?
-assume agents know policy coe¢ cients: Sargent, Williams and Zha (2006) -act as if that policy will not change in the future (just like the central bank when it sets policy)
Model Estimation
Bayesian inference
Solving the private sector's decision problem every period conditional on the policy coe¢ cients t gives:
This can be used as the state equation for the Kalman Filter to evaluate the likelihood.
What happens when the policy coe¢ cients imply indeterminacy?
-we choose the baseline solution in Sims (2002) We back out the estimated measurement series from the benchmark speci…cation and simulate the model for benchmark parameter estimates and the observed histories of the endogenous variables
We scale the measurement series between 1 (benchmark) and 0 (no measurement error) to trace its e¤ect on policy:
-for observed histories and given measurement error, policy coe¢ cients and policy shocks have to change 
Measurement Errors and CB Decision Making

Conclusion
Learning can help explain the switch from policy rules that imply indeterminacy to policy rules that imply determinacy
The government chooses to implement a di¤erent policy than would be warranted under full information Measurement error and data misperception is the key ingredient in this mechanism This leads to indeterminate outcomes in the private sector equilibrium: central bank learning as 'microfoundation'for indetermiancy Robust mechanism
